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Human Rights and the Leap of Love 
Alexandre Lefebvre 
University of Sydney 
For years in Anglophone scholarship on Henri Bergson it has been a 
convention to remark that one was writing on a once famous but now 
forgotten philosopher. Thankfully, on the 75th anniversary of his death, it is 
safe to say this is no longer the case. His major French interlocutors are 
either widely translated into English (such as Gilles Deleuze) or else are in 
the process of being so (such as Vladimir Jankélévitch and Frédéric Worms). 
And today there are outstanding books in English on nearly every branch of 
his thought from his philosophy of time, to psychology, metaphysics, 
evolutionary theory, aesthetics, practical philosophy, theology, and his 
impact on subsequent philosophy.1 
This said, if there is one area of his oeuvre to which this convention 
might still apply to it is his social and political philosophy, and in particular, 
to his last book, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932). There are, to 
be sure, valuable works that trace the impact of his thought on later political 
thinkers and figures, or else that situate Bergson’s work within wider 
discourses of power, politics, and empire.2 But this is different from 
developing his political philosophy on its own terms and assessing what 
resources it has to offer us here and now. In my previous book I tried to 
develop Bergson’s political philosophy with a focus on human rights.3 In 
this article I take up the same topic but with a different aim and from a 
different angle. First, I want to give Bergson’s message on human rights in a 
short, clear form that is accessible to those readers who are unfamiliar with 
him. I believe there is something very simple and powerful in Bergson’s 
conception of human rights that can contribute to a wider community of 
scholarship and activism. Second, I will stress a surprising and useful facet 
of his approach to human rights, namely that human rights are a tool to help 
individuals transform and cultivate themselves. To put the point directly, 
Bergson sees human rights as the best resource available to us in our present 
day and age to infuse our lives with a loving and joyful sensibility. Thus, 
human rights are not simply an institution and discourse that advances 
global social justice, but Bergson also shows how human rights are a means 
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for individuals to care for themselves. This is the simple message I hope to 
convey in this article.   
 
Henri Bergson 
To introduce Bergson to a wider audience it is best to begin with a bit of 
biography. Bergson, it may be surprising to learn, is significant to the human 
rights project not merely for his intellectual contribution but also because he 
was an important actor in early twentieth century internationalism.  
Our story begins in 1916 when the French government entrusted him 
with a series of diplomatic assignments, first to Spain and then, much more 
importantly, to the United States. The purpose of this second assignment 
was to strike up a personal relationship with President Woodrow Wilson in 
order to persuade the United States to enter the Great War. Now, on first 
impression, Bergson would seem to be an unlikely candidate for such a 
momentous task. At the time he was the world’s most renowned 
philosopher, and he spoke impeccable English, but he had next to no 
experience in diplomacy or political affairs. And yet his nomination was 
astute. For what Bergson was able to do, precisely because he was an 
eminent philosopher, was to reflect the President’s own sense of historic 
mission back to him. Bergson’s biographers put it nicely: “In essence, 
Bergson says to Wilson: ‘you are philosopher, prophet, and king. For the 
first time in human history these three figures are one.’ And if Bergson is 
persuasive, it is because he believes what he says. In this sense, Bergson is 
truly ‘witness to the truth’: he presents Wilson the very image he would like 
to have of himself. He is witness to Wilson’s desire; or in other words, he 
guarantees Wilson’s ideal self. Only a philosopher could have provided this 
guarantee.”4  
Bergson is thus at the heart of a world historic event: the entry of the 
United States into the First World War. But his foray into politics and 
diplomacy didn't end there. Due to his close relationship with the Wilson 
Administration, his role in the Paris Peace Conference as a negotiator 
between France and the United States, and his own intellectual stature, 
Bergson was appointed President of the League of Nation’s newly founded 
Commission for Intellectual Cooperation. Forerunner to UNESCO, the goals 
of the Commission may seem modest. It was created to foster intellectual 
cooperation between member nations, including student and scholar 
exchanges, translation of scholarship, dissemination of scientific results, and 
reports on intellectual life in member countries. By all accounts, Bergson 
took his responsibilities very seriously. A touching story has him pouring 
over his notes, “like a schoolboy before an exam,” prior to a meeting to 
request a small sum from the League.5 Yet all this hard work was done with 
a real sense of purpose. In his mind, the Commission was nothing less than 
the spiritual wing of the League of Nations and indispensable to its broader 
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aim of internationalism. As he states in his Presidential address, “In asking 
us to lay the foundation of an organization for international cooperation the 
League of Nation has set a mainly scientific goal. But at the same time it 
probably also pursues a moral goal, the very one it has set for itself: to raise 
a great monument to fraternity, to solidarity and accord between people.”6 
Thus, in these two posts–as emissary to the United States during the Great 
War and as president of the Commission for International Cooperation–
Bergson is both a philosopher who influenced the highest levels of policy 
and also an administrator who labored for a philosophical ideal. He is, to 
borrow a phrase from Mary Ann Glendon, one of those rare figures to have 
straddled the forum and the tower.7 
The circumstances of his last days and death are poignant for a human 
rights imagination.8 By 1941 the Nazi occupation of France had begun and 
the first discriminatory laws introduced. According to several testimonies, 
the Pétain government had offered Bergson the title of “honorary Aryan,” as 
the Jewish descent of France’s greatest living philosopher posed some 
embarrassment. Bergson not only declined the title but also made a great 
effort, crippled as he was by arthritis and helped along by nurses, to line up 
on a cold winter’s day and register himself as a Jew—the cruel irony being 
that he probably contracted the bronchitis that killed him on this occasion. 
Last, although these letters have been lost, just before he died Bergson is 
reported to have renounced in writing all honors and titles bestowed on him 
by France, distinctions which he cherished. A sad end for a man who 
championed international cooperation in politics and who was often 
reproached for optimism in his philosophy.  
 
A Contemporary Human Rights Debate 
Bergson’s reflections on human rights are found almost entirely in his last 
book, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. It was published in 1932, a 
year that falls between his hopeful work on internationalism and the 
tragedies of the late 1930s and early 1940s. Now, it wouldn't be accurate to 
suggest that Bergson has a fleshed out theory of human rights in Two 
Sources. His discussion is confined to roughly a dozen pages scattered 
throughout the book. What he offers, instead, are flashes of insight in his 
remarks on human rights, remarks which are embedded within a broader 
reflection on morality, religion, and politics. 
Rather than plunge directly into Two Sources, I would like to introduce 
Bergson’s relevance for a contemporary audience by way of a present-day 
debate. In recent years no work has generated more interest or controversy 
in the field of human rights as Samuel Moyn’s Last Utopia (2010). Moyn’s 
thesis is that the human rights project as we know and practice it today is of 
relatively recent vintage, indeed much more so than we typically imagine. 
Far from coming out of the great political revolutions of the late eighteenth 
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century, Moyn claims that human rights emerged as a viable and popular 
moral, legal, and political phenomenon only in response to the collapse of 
socialist and liberal utopias in the mid-to-late 1970s. The reason why it 
flourished at this time is because it offered a minimalist and moral 
alternative to failed political paradigms.9 “In this atmosphere,” Moyn 
explains, “an internationalism revolving around individual rights surged, 
and it did so because it was defined as a pure alternative in an age of 
ideological betrayal and political collapse.”10  
As one can imagine, this thesis has been debated in different 
disciplines. For political theorists it raises issues as to whether socialist and 
liberal utopias are truly dead, whether the concept of utopia in general 
remains productive, and whether human rights help to remake our political 
sensibility and to what end.11 But the main controversy The Last Utopia has 
stirred up is in the discipline of history, for the good reason that its critical 
thrust is directed at the historiography of human rights and what Moyn 
attacks as its progressivism and triumphalism. Here is his indictment:  
Historians in the United States started writing the history of human 
rights a decade ago. Since that time, a new field has crystallized 
and burgeoned. Almost unanimously, contemporary historians 
have adopted a celebratory attitude toward the emergence and 
progress of human rights, providing recent enthusiasms with 
uplifting backstories and differing primarily about whether to 
locate the true breakthrough with the Greeks or the Jews, medieval 
Christian or early modern philosophers, democratic revolutionaries 
or abolitionist heroes, American internationalists, or antiracist 
visionaries. […] They have used history to confirm their [i.e., 
human rights] inevitable rise rather than register the choices that 
were made and the accidents that happen.12 
On Moyn’s account, nearly all historians of human rights have fallen into the 
same trap: teleology. Indeed, all that really distinguishes them is the date 
from which they begin to narrate the steady march to our human rights 
present: whether it be ancient, Christian, early modern, and so forth. But 
perhaps his main target—or at least, a highly representative one—is Lynn 
Hunt’s Inventing Human Rights (2008).  
Hunt is a leading American historian and in Inventing Human Rights 
she locates the origins of human rights in a widespread cultural 
transformation that takes place in the eighteenth century. She starts from the 
premise that human rights require a society at large (or at least its middle 
and upper classes) to undergo a sentimental education in order to become 
widely accepted. Her basic claim is that if human rights are to become 
popular as an ideal and institution, it is necessary for people to learn to 
empathize more broadly beyond their own narrow group. They must be 
able, in a word, to step into the shoes of a wide variety of others. “Human 
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rights are not just a doctrine formulated in documents,” Hunt states. “They 
rest on a disposition toward other people, a set of convictions about what 
people are like and how they know right and wrong in the secular world. 
Philosophical ideas, legal traditions, and revolutionary politics had to have 
this kind of inner emotional reference point for human rights to be truly 
‘self-evident’ […] and these feelings had to be felt by many people, not just 
the philosophers who wrote about them.”13  
Much of Hunt’s book is spent documenting the ways in which 
sentimental education occurs in the eighteenth century. For example, she 
turns to the immense popularity of epistolary novels—such as Richardson’s 
Pamela (1740) and Clarissa (1747-1748), and Rousseau’s Julie (1761)—to argue 
that this genre prepares a reading public to empathize across more broadly 
defined boundaries.14 The reason why this kind of sentimental education is 
so crucial to her argument is that it matches and sustains what she calls the 
“inner logic” of human rights.15  
This logic is as follows. Universal rights are declared at a particular 
point in time (her book focuses on the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen of 1789). Afterwards comes the messy business of deciding 
to whom and what these rights actually apply. Hunt marshals a wealth of 
documentary evidence to depict the extension of universal rights as a series 
of ever widening inclusions. In France, the first groups to be extended rights 
were perceived as more or less unobjectionable, such as Protestant males. 
Then, following in their wake, more marginal groups petitioned for these 
same rights on the basis of the previous extension. It is from this process that 
Hunt infers the “inner logic” of human rights: 
The French revolution, more than any other event, revealed that 
human rights have an inner logic. As the deputies faced the need to 
turn their lofty ideals into specific laws, they inadvertently 
developed a kind of conceivability or thinkability scale. No one 
knew in advance which groups were going to come up for 
discussion, when they would come up, or what the resolution of 
their status would be. But sooner or later, it became clear that 
granting rights to some groups (Protestants, for example) was more 
easily imagined than granting them to others (women). The logic of 
the process determined that as soon as a highly conceivable group 
came up for discussion (propertied males, Protestants), those in the 
same kind of category but located lower on the conceivability scale 
(propertyless males, Jews) would inevitably appear on the 
horizon.16  
Hunt is fond of calling this process a “cascade.”17 But we could also think of 
it as a series of concentric circles. Rights and sympathy are at first gathered 
into a small and exclusive core (say, propertied Christian males). Yet, over 
time, the effects start to ripple outward, growing wider and wider, until 
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eventually such rights and sympathy reach the outer shore of humanity as a 
whole. Such a process may take years, decades, even centuries. But, 
according to Hunt, the Enlightenment unleashes an inexorable force of 
sympathy and fellow human feeling that over time will vanquish prejudice 
and establish an international human rights culture and regime. To quote 
the title of her penultimate chapter, which she herself takes from John 
Adams, “There will be no end to it.”18  
Now this is exactly the kind of history of human rights that Moyn 
takes to task in Last Utopia. It is entirely too progressivist, too laminar, and 
too triumphalist to be creditable. It presupposes that the institutions, 
sentiments, rivals and opponents of human rights remain steady over 
centuries, whether in their first iteration as the rights of man in 1789, or in 
their relative disappearance in the nineteenth century of state-building and 
colonialism, or in their adoption by the League of Nations and the United 
Nations for state-centric internationalism, or right up until our own 
contemporary global movement that champions human rights as checks and 
limits on states. This kind of narrative is not properly historical for Moyn. It 
is, in his words, “church history.”19  
It is at this point that I would like to reintroduce Bergson. He too 
would strongly object to Hunt’s teleology and progressivism, but for 
different reasons. His quarrel would not be with her depiction of history. 
Rather, it would be with her account of sentiment, and in particular, with 
her account of the nature and spread of sympathy. Hunt thinks that 
sympathy for other people (which for her underlies human rights) can 
radiate out indefinitely. Properly cultivated it can expand from family, to 
tribe, to nation, all the way to humanity. But for Bergson this ignores 
something essential: morality is not infinitely extendable. It has limits, 
biologically built-in limits, and to turn a blind eye to these is catastrophic for 
the theory and practice of human rights. I explain why in the following 
section. 
 
The Critique of Human Rights 
A key respect in which Bergson remains our contemporary, even seventy-
five years after his death, is that he is a naturalist moral philosopher. 
Whereas many peers of his time thought that human beings were inherently 
selfish and vicious, he held that we are naturally sociable, cooperative, and 
other-regarding. His reason is simple: there are tremendous evolutionary 
advantages to solidarity and cooperation. Thus, rather than see human 
beings as naturally bad, as “red in tooth and claw,” he suggests that we are 
naturally good. Morality—and all that goes with it, including empathy, 
cooperation, reciprocity, and solidarity—is not extrinsic to our evolved 
nature. It is a product of it. 
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  The first thirty pages of Two Sources develop this point. But it is at this 
early stage of his book that Bergson makes a crucial move. If, as he says, 
morality “is in essence biological,” i.e., if we instinctively care and feel for 
our fellows, it follows that morality has sharp natural limits.20 He does not 
mince words: “Who can help seeing that social cohesion is largely due to the 
necessity of a community to protect itself against others, and that it is 
primarily as against all other men that we love the men with whom we live? 
Such is the primitive instinct.”21 This, then, is the critical point: if the 
biological function of morality is to ensure the cohesion and solidarity of 
groups (and thus to help ensure the survival of the individual), it means that 
the scope of moral obligation extends no further than the group, however 
large it may be. To use Bergson’s term, to a greater or lesser degree, all 
societies are constitutively “closed.” Underpinned by our natural morality, 
“their essential characteristic is [to] include at any moment a certain number 
of individuals and exclude others.”22  
This view closely anticipates present-day naturalist accounts of 
morality. Consider, for example, the eminent primatologist Frans de Waal. 
In his 2004 Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Princeton University he 
also argues that morality is the outgrowth of our evolved cooperative 
tendencies.23 Just as Bergson does, he observes that this entails an underside. 
“It should be noted,” says de Waal, “that the evolutionary pressures 
responsible for our moral tendencies may not have all be nice and positive. 
After all, morality is very much an in-group phenomenon.”24 And in a later 
lecture he continues, “Morality evolved to deal with [one’s] own community 
first, and has only recently begun to include members of other groups, 
humanity in general, and non-human animals. While applauding the 
expansion of the circle, this expansion is constrained by affordability, that is, 
circles are allowed to expand in times of abundance but will inevitably 
shrink when resources dwindle. […] A level playing field, in which all 
circles count equally, clashes with ancient survival strategies.”25 According 
to de Waal, then, only in times of abundance are groups able to expand 
moral concern and consideration to distant others. When times are tough 
and resources scarce, the circle of morality contracts to a core membership.  
On these two issues Bergson and contemporary naturalism are fully 
consistent: first, that morality is a product of evolution; and second, that as a 
consequence it has limits as to how far it can extend. This is where we return 
to Hunt and Inventing Human Rights. Moyn’s criticism, recall, is that the 
historical progress of human rights she describes is all too smooth and 
constant. Bergson would have a similar objection, though with a different 
target: that the expansion of sympathy she describes is all too smooth and 
constant. Hunt believes that sympathy has the capacity to grow until it 
encompasses all of humanity. All it has to do is overcome prejudice. Yet for 
Bergson this ignores the very real limit of evolved morality. Sympathy 
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cannot fully shed its origin: it was made for groups and to groups it shall 
remain. 
This is of basic importance to Bergson’s theory of human rights. As we 
will see, he too believes that such rights can be universal and encompass all 
of humanity. But he is deeply skeptical that such universality can be 
achieved by extending sympathy and moral obligation from smaller to 
bigger groups. Indeed, to think otherwise is not just mistaken but 
mendacious. That is the message of a key critical passage in Two Sources:  
When we lay down that the duty of respecting the life and property 
of others is a fundamental demand of social life, what society are 
we talking about? To answer we need only consider what happens 
in time of war. Murder and pillage, as well as perfidy, fraud and 
lies become not only lawful; they are praiseworthy. Just like the 
witches of Macbeth, the belligerents will say: “Fair is foul, and foul 
is fair.” Would this be possible, would the transformation take 
place so easily, generally and instantaneously, if it were really a 
certain attitude of man toward man [i.e., of human beings toward 
human beings] that society had recommended up till then? Oh, I 
know what society says (it has, I repeat, its reasons for saying so); 
but to know what it thinks and what it wants, we must not listen 
too much to what it says, we must look at what it does. It says that 
the duties it defines are indeed, in principle, duties toward 
humanity, but that under exceptional circumstances, regrettably 
unavoidable, they are for the time being suspended in practice 
[l’exercice s’en trouve suspendu].26  
Bergson is not an author prone to sarcasm. Here, however, his temper seems 
pushed to its limit. Yet we should be clear about what draws his ire. Bergson 
is not upset that in times of war morality flips its general orientation, such 
that what was once foul now becomes fair (and vice versa). That’s just the 
nature of morality. Sympathy and obligation are born from evolution and it 
would be misguided to expect them to lead beyond the mutual preservation 
of self and society. What infuriates him is the moralism and hypocrisy of 
pretending to ground human rights on sympathy and moral obligation. In 
refusing to acknowledge the inherent closure of morality, moral and 
political promises are issued that will not be kept in moments of crisis.  
This criticism can be put more starkly. Bergson’s argument is not just 
that sympathy and obligation are an inappropriate foundation for human 
rights. That much is obvious. The real issue is that the purpose of human 
rights is to defend people from sympathy and obligation, that is to say, from 
sympathy and obligation when they (inevitably) contract back into a narrow 
group. This is why a theory of human rights such as Hunt’s is misguided. Its 
progressive narrative misdescribes the social, psychological, and affective 
basis of human rights. Worse, by configuring human rights as an extension 
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of our closed moral nature–of our sympathy and obligation–she links 
human rights to the very thing they are meant to guard against.  
We can bring this criticism home by placing Two Sources in its context. 
Written in dark times. Bergson has the ravages of the Great War just behind 
him, and the explicit anticipation of the Atomic Age just in front.27 It is not 
for nothing that in a later interview he remarks, “Hitler proved the truth of 
the two sources.”28 He is acutely aware that sympathy and obligation are 
potentially very dangerous. It is by confining duty and sympathy to an 
exclusive group, to “people like us,” that one group of people persecute and 
attack another. Thus, to return to our problem, we can see why for Bergson 
it is a terrible mistake to presume that human rights are based on the kind of 
sympathy and obligation that holds groups together. It makes what should 
be a shield against closed morality a pillar for it.  
 
The Closed Life 
In my previous book on Bergson I discussed at length this failure of human 
rights—or rather, this failure of human rights as modeled on the extension 
of sympathy and obligation—to protect all human beings.29 In this article, 
however, I would like to focus on a second danger that Bergson identifies. It 
is that closed morality, if unchecked, threatens to enclose human beings—all 
human beings, insiders and outsiders alike—in a stunted emotional and 
spiritual life.  
Let me explain. Closed morality has an unattractive name–who likes 
to be called “closed,” after all? But the truth is that the meaning of this term 
is more nuanced than meets the eye. Throughout Two Sources Bergson 
identifies its many healthy emotions and virtues. In the early part of the 
book he lists the best and most prominent which include discipline and self-
sacrifice, obedience, solidarity and fellowship, honesty and fairness, 
tranquility, loyalty, security, and patriotism.30 That said, although a life 
guided by closed morality may not be awful or even unhappy, it is 
nevertheless limited. It crowds out a whole range—a whole half, in 
Bergson’s words—of joyful affects and passions. In particular, it closes off 
emotions and experiences that depend either on dissolving and dissipating 
the self (such as joy and heroism) or else on leaping beyond a closed 
community (such as love and charity). And the reason it does so, i.e., the 
reason why certain emotions and experiences are inaccessible to closed 
morality, is because it is constitutively self-centered. This is the paradox of 
closed morality: it turns self and society toward one another in a mutually 
reinforcing and mutually regarding relation of sympathy and obligation. 
The individual, he states, “is part and parcel of society; he and it are 
absorbed together in the same task of individual and social-preservation. 
Both are self-centered.”31 And again: “At once individual and social, the soul 
here moves round in a circle. It is closed.”32  
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In and of itself there is nothing wrong with this self-centered nature. 
Closed morality is a product of evolution and we should not expect it to 
behave otherwise. Yet what would be dispiriting is to assume that closed 
morality exhausts all possible permutations of morality, i.e., that closed 
morality is the foundation of not just of exclusive attachments (such as to 
family or country), but of open and universal ones as well. For what is lost in 
this assumption–or better, what we lose of ourselves in this assumption–are, 
in the words of Jankélévitch, “[all] those absurd and useless virtues without 
which life would lose all its value.”33  
Here, then, is the second criticism Bergson makes of human rights as 
an extension of sympathy and obligation: We become personally and 
spiritually trapped in closed morality. Or, to speak more precisely, by basing 
human rights in closed morality we transform one of the most powerful 
tools (i.e., human rights) to help us escape from the psychic life of closed 
morality into just another support for it.   
As we will see in the next section, for Bergson the best and most 
important thing human rights can do is to initiate all human beings into 
emotions that closed morality knows nothing about: truly open love, and 
joy. It is precisely that potential which is ruined by seeing human rights as 
nothing but expanded sympathy and obligation. Consider here 
Jankélévitch’s depiction of the great gradualist dream of (closed) morality: 
“In ethics, such a symmetry [between closed and open morality] would not 
only be economical, it would also be reassuring; to enlarge domestic and 
corporative solidarity in small doses and to obtain, at the end of this 
magnificent widening, charity: what a godsend for egoism! Virtue and 
group interest would finally be reconciled. […] Charity will appear as the 
superlative of egoism!”34 Jankélévitch’s tone (and Bergson’s too, as I noted 
above) is contemptuous: he leads us to picture a self-satisfied soul, greedy in 
spirit and flabby in mind, who wants to have his ethical cake and eat it too. 
But just as contempt lurks in pity, so too is there pity in contempt. For 
Bergson (as well as for Jankélévitch) such a person is an object of concern as 
well as one of criticism. The way in which he tries to clutch at charity—as if 
openness meant only to broaden the closed—all but ensures that an open 
love and joy elude him. 
 
Human Rights as Works of Love 
One way to think of Two Sources is as a book on love. Or rather, as a book on 
two different kinds of love. There is the kind of “closed” love I’ve described: 
an intensely felt attachment for a specific person or group. But there is also 
“open” love: an equally intensely felt attachment but that is non-exclusive 
and universal. What Bergson means exactly by open love is difficult to 
explain. The closest available concept is Christian agape. For the moment, 
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however, let us say that open love refers less to a particular relation to an 
object or beloved and more to an exalted state or attitude of the soul. 
Now, for Bergson, love—closed or open—is not just a feeling or an 
inner state of mind. It is a veritable creative force. It is capable of 
crystallizing into a doctrine, a work of art, an institution, and many other 
forms.35 For example, as I write, presidential candidates in the United States 
are proposing to build a wall along the border with Mexico. That wall would 
be a crystallization—a brutal and literal concretization—of closed love. But 
open love can crystallize as well. In Two Sources Bergson points to several 
occasions in history where individuals, moved by such love, create lasting 
works from it. These include, “the sages of Greece, the prophets of Israel, the 
Arahants of Buddhism, and others besides.”36 His two privileged examples, 
however, are Christianity and the Sermon on the Mount, and human rights 
and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. These are the 
paradigmatic moments in which humankind has sought to overcome the 
boundaries of the closed society. Bergson writes, 
The morality of the Gospels is essentially that of the open soul: are 
we not justified in pointing out that it borders upon paradox, and 
even upon contradiction in its more specific recommendations? If 
riches are an evil, should we not be injuring the poor in giving 
them what we possess? […] But the paradox falls away, the 
contradiction vanishes, if we consider the intention of these 
maxims, which is to induce a disposition of the soul [un état d’âme]. 
It is not for the poor, but for his own sake, that the rich man should 
give up his riches. […] We should need then, strictly speaking, a 
direct expression of the movement and the tendency; but if we still 
want—and we cannot avoid it—to translate [them] into the 
language of the static and the motionless, we shall have formulas 
that border on contradiction.37 
Of all political systems, [democracy] is indeed the furthest removed 
from nature, the only one to transcend, at least in intention, the 
conditions of the “closed society.” It confers on man inviolable 
rights… [Democratic theory] proclaims liberty, demands equality, 
and reconciles these two hostile sisters by reminding them that they 
are sisters, by exalting above everything fraternity. Looked at from 
this angle, the republican motto shows that the third term dispels 
the oft-noted contradiction between the two others, and that the 
essential thing is fraternity: a fact which would make it possible to 
say that democracy is evangelical in essence and that its motive 
power is love.38   
I juxtapose these passages to make two points about the role of love in 
human rights. First, as I have said, human rights have their origin in love. To 
borrow a phrase from Kierkegaard, they are “works of love.” And clearly, 
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Bergson does not think that open love reveals itself only once in the history 
of human rights—as if the French Revolution and its Declaration was the 
sole occasion that it broke through. Closest to his heart is the League of 
Nations, the roots of which he traces to love and not tactical or pragmatic 
motivations. Indeed, it is because he thinks the League of Nations originates 
in open love that he so bitterly laments its failure: “Thus was lost the sole 
chance offered to the world, ever since the announcement of the Gospels, to 
infuse the evangelical spirit into relations between nations. Humanity would 
have raised itself to undreamed of heights. Instead it fell lower than ever. 
Corruptio optimi pessima [the corruption of the best is the worst of all].”39 
The second point is that human rights have the power to spread love. 
As he says with respect to the Gospels, the intention of these maxims is to 
“induce a disposition of the soul.”40 In bringing love into the world, then, 
the Sermon on the Mount and the Declaration of the Rights of Man have the 
potential to introduce all human beings to a way of life that is open. That is 
their great purpose. Even if most of us are unable (or initially, unwilling) to 
create great works of love on our own, contact with such works has the 
potential to awaken this capacity within us. As Bergson says, “When we 
bring these great moral leaders [grands hommes de bien] to life in our minds, 
when we hear them speak and watch them act, we feel that they 
communicate to us something of their fervor, and that they sweep us up in 
their movement.”41 Such events and documents “echo” in all human beings 
and help stir, if only fleetingly, a kind of love distinct from preference and 
closure.42 That is why, for Bergson, the promise of the Sermon on the Mount 
and the Declaration of the Rights of Man, along with all other creations of 
love, is to turn each and every human being away from a life in which 
partiality and exclusion reign. In this respect, then, it is necessary to insert an 
addendum to a remark by Jankélévitch. ‘This opening and mobilization of 
the soul has taken place” he states, “thanks to the Prophets first, then with 
Christianity.”43 For Bergson, this task is today continued by human rights.  
 
Love and Joy 
It is fine and well to say that human rights are created by open love. But 
what does that mean? What is this exalted spiritual condition to which 
human rights are meant to introduce all of us? Bergson never positively 
defines it. Instead, he offers an uncompromising contrast between open love 
and the kind of preferential and exclusive love characteristic of closed 
morality.  
The other attitude is that of the open soul. What, in that case, is 
allowed in? Suppose we say that it embraces all of humanity, we 
would not be going too far, we would not even be going far 
enough, since its love may extend to animals, to plants, to all 
nature. And yet no one of these things which would thus fill it 
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would suffice to define the attitude taken by the soul, for it could, 
strictly speaking, do without all of them. Its form is not dependent 
on its content. We have just filled it; we could just as easily empty it 
again. “Charity” would persist in him who possesses “charity,” 
though there be no other living creature on earth.44   
This is an astonishing comment on love. Bergson takes an emotion that, on 
first impression, seems to be warm and fuzzy and safe, and demonstrates 
how austere and almost unthinkable it becomes when pushed to its genuine 
meaning (which, for him, is really its only meaning). For in trying to imagine 
a truly universal and inclusive kind of love Bergson effectively asks us to 
conceive of it outside the categories of preference and esteem. And that is 
deeply counter-intuitive. Love is something we ordinarily take to be 
deserved, gain, and earned. We love something because it is worthy of it. 
Granted, love based on esteem has nice versions (such as friendship and 
marriage) as well as nasty ones (such as chauvinism). Still, the fact remains 
that all such kinds of love are inextricably bound up with preference, hence 
with closure and exclusion.  
Open love rubs against all those concepts, practices, and forms of life 
by which we have come to learn what love is. Perhaps it is better to think of 
it not as love for something but as being in love, if we take the preposition to 
mean the state of being enclosed, engulfed, or surrounded by something. In 
this respect, open love is better expressed as a mood or disposition. It is a 
way of being in the world rather than an attachment to any specific thing in 
it.  
Open love is the emotion from which human rights are born, and 
which they in turn disseminate. It unsettles and breaks through our ordinary 
way of being in the world, with its familiar orderings of preference and 
exclusion. But why, to ask a blunt question, is open love so good and 
desirable? Its appeal at a social and political level is obvious. Love is a 
bulwark—the bulwark—against closed morality. But on a micro-scale, i.e., at 
an ethical and existential level, why should people want to experience it 
firsthand?  
There are two good reasons. First, open love is pure: it is unalloyed 
with preference, exclusion, or hatred. And that, Bergson makes clear, is 
something only rarely felt and enjoyed. “Who can help seeing,” he asks, 
“that social cohesion is largely due to the necessity of a community to 
protect itself against others, and that it is primarily as against all other men 
that we love the men with whom we live? Such is the primitive instinct.”45 
Here, then, is the first benefit of open love for individuals: in a very literal 
sense, it suspends the emotional life of our species. It holds out a momentary 
reprieve, necessarily fleeting and fragile, from a psyche naturally tainted by 
closure.46 Or, positively speaking, it makes available a whole gamut of 
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emotions that closed morality blocks off access to, such as charity, simplicity, 
generosity, and joy.47  
The second reason why open love is desirable is closely related. It 
provides an escape from ourselves. Here one of the oldest known definitions 
of love is relevant. In Symposium, Plato claims that love means that I am not 
centered in myself.48 What Bergson does in Two Sources is push this idea to 
its limit. Closed morality, recall, along with its version of love, is 
constitutively self-centered. “At once individual and social the soul here 
moves round in a circle. It is closed.”49 According to Bergson, it is because 
open love splits this circuit, because it ruptures the mutual reinforcement of 
self and society, that it alone deserves the name love: it transcends the limit 
of a closed community and, just as crucially, leads the self beyond its social 
ego. Open love is what biologists might call a saltation, and it is no 
coincidence that Bergson uses the language of leaping and jumping—“un 
saut brusque”50—to describe the kind of movement and effort needed to 
break from the social self.51  
Now, from one perspective, the prospect of setting aside the social self 
is terrifying. As Bergson is the first to admit, closed morality is what gives 
our ego its sense of identity and purpose. “Its solidity lies in this 
solidarity.”52 Yet at the same time, he is clear that a great reward attends the 
leap. It leads to the best and highest emotion to which human beings can 
aspire: joy. 
Joy is an important–and extraordinarily recurrent53—topic in 
Bergson’s work. It is also an emotion that he always ties to a single feature or 
capacity of human nature: creativity and self-creation. He states this 
connection in several jubilant passages. For example, “Wherever there is joy, 
there is creation; the richer the creation, the deeper the joy.”54 Or again, 
“Philosophy stands to gain in finding some absolute in the moving world of 
phenomena. But we shall gain also in our feeling greater joy and strength. 
Greater joy because the reality invented before our eyes will give each one of 
us, unceasingly, certain of the satisfactions which are now and again 
procures for the privileged.”55 Or yet again, “The soul that is opening, and 
before whose eyes material objects vanish, is lost in sheer joy. Pleasure and 
well-being are something, joy is more.”56  
Love and joy are intimately connected. But we must be precise about 
the connection Bergson establishes, for it is not the one that commonsense 
leads us to believe. Metaphorically speaking, but only metaphorically 
speaking, open love is “joyful” in that it is free of partiality, indifference, 
enmity, and exclusion. It is free, in Bergson’s words, from the “morality of 
the city.”57 But love is not joy in and of itself. Neither does love elicit joy by 
filling our lives with more positive and less hateful affects. Joy is always and 
only tied to creation. Properly speaking, open love is joyful for Bergson not 
because it is not hateful but because it generates the deepest and most 
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comprehensive kind of personal transformation. Closed morality may 
contain pleasure and comfort, but love and joy remain—conceptually, yet 
not experientially—separate. Love elicits joy through the creation of a new 
moral nature.58  
This relation between love and joy matters for human rights. It is the 
second key respect in which human rights ameliorate our emotional or 
spiritual life. By introducing individuals to love, and thus potentially setting 
a deep personal transformation into motion, human rights elicit joy. By 
loosening the hold that the “morality of the city” has over us—or, more 
literally and strikingly, by loosening the hold that our evolved (closed) 
morality has over us—human rights deliver us to the joy of creation and 
self-creation. 
 
Human Rights, Love, and Other People 
In this article I have set Bergson against an orthodoxy in human rights 
discourse: that care and concern for the whole of humanity is reached by 
learning to broaden a narrower set of attachments. Lynn Hunt was my 
representative of this view, but in truth, it is widespread in modern and 
contemporary political thought.59 To conclude, I would like to restate this 
contrast from another perspective. It goes to show just how radical and 
unfamiliar Bergson’s approach to human rights is.  
As I said, both Hunt (and many others) and Bergson agree that human 
rights require, and also foster, sympathy and generosity for humanity as a 
whole. The difference is how they get there. For Hunt, the process is step-by-
step. Over time, and thanks to a process of sentimental education that begins 
in the Enlightenment, the ambit of sympathy and moral concern has been 
able to extend past kith and kin, include ever larger groups, and gradually 
encompass distant strangers and humanity as a whole. This, you may recall, 
is what she called the “inner” or “cascading” logic of human rights.60  
We know that for Bergson this is doomed to fail. Sympathy cannot 
indefinitely radiate outward because it was designed to—or rather, because 
it has evolved in order to—make groups internally cohesive. “The closed 
society,” he says, “is that whose members hold together, caring nothing for 
the rest of humanity.”61 What then does he propose? How can human 
beings, saddled as we are with evolved morality, love universally? 
Bergson’s answer is complex and I cannot hope to fully address it 
here.62 The condensed version is that he adopts and reworks the Christian 
conception of agape. At the heart of Christianity is the idea that God creates a 
new relationship with humanity by loving us, in a way that we cannot love 
each other unaided.63 In Two Sources, Bergson preserves this scheme, but he 
makes a crucial substitution and addition. Instead of God enabling love, it is 
what Bergson calls “life,” “evolution,” or the “élan vital” that performs this 
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role. “Love” is the name he gives to the emotion (sentiment, in French) that 
accompanies our power to tap into and realize the essence of life itself: 
interconnection, mobility, creativity, and movement. “By going deeply into 
this new aspect of morality,” says Bergson in reference to love, “we should 
find the feeling of a coincidence, real or imaginary, with the generative effort 
of life.”64 And more succinctly: “[Love’s] direction is exactly that of life’s 
élan.”65  
Here is the point I wish to make: Open love is exactly the kind of love 
that Bergson thinks human rights teach, but it is not in the first instance a 
love we feel for other people. It is not inspired by other people. It is not even 
exactly directed to other people. Love, instead, is Bergson’s word for the 
exaltation and intensity of being that comes through immersion in life (what, 
in Christianity, was understood as immersion in God).  
With this, Bergson turns our normal way about thinking about love 
for humanity, as well as humanitarian concern, on its head. Why? Because 
love for other people—along with the kind of sympathy, attention, 
solicitude, and care for other people that Hunt describes—is, according to 
him, a by-product of an altogether different and higher kind of love; one that 
is essentially unconcerned with any particular object, including other people. 
That is not to say that Bergson downplays love for distant strangers or love 
for humanity. But, unlike closed and exclusive love, an open and universal 
love cannot be attained by direct attachment to its object. We learn to love all 
others on condition that we do not set out to love specific others. Or, as 
Bergson says, “[Love] has not aimed at an object; it has shot beyond and 
reached humanity only by passing through it.”66 
Louis Lavelle, an existential philosopher, has a beautiful name for 
what Bergson describes: sacred indifference. It consists, he says, “in 
according no preference to any of the beings upon our path, in giving 
everyone our entire presence, and responding with precise faithfulness to 
the call they utter to us.”67 Sacred indifference is what human rights strive 
for. This is the case for human rights considered as a moral and political 
project: the absolute and incommensurable justice it represents depends on 
an impartiality that closed morality denies itself. This is also the case for 
human rights considered as an existential option, with its joyous release 
from partiality and hatred. To thus care for others (for all others) without 
prejudice, and to thus also care for oneself by attaining love, joy, and 
generosity, it is necessary to leap away from direct attachment to other 
people. Human rights, astonishingly, are a springboard to do just that.68 
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